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PEOPLE V. BB,N'fLEY

[58 e.2tl

[Crim. No. 7105. In Bank. S!!pt.27, 1962.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES
ABNER BENTLEY, Defendant and Appellant.
[la,lb] Criminal Law - Judgment- Procedure for Determining
Penalty.~On trial of the penalty phase of a first degree murder case, it was not error to admit eyewitness testimony
regarding defendant's apparent leadership of a group that
robbed, kidnapped and attempted to murder a service station
attendant in another state about a month after the murder in
question was committed, despitetbe fact that there was
ample other evidence in the record of defendant's repeated
criminal behavior, where thel'c was no e\'idence that defendant
had killed any of his victims before the murder in question
and the jury was entitled to know that he was not revulsed by
that killing but was willing to kill again.
[2] lei. - Judgment - Procedure for Determining Penalty. - Pen.
Code, § 190,1, providing for separate trials of the guilt and
penalty issues for offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment, embodies the broad, liberal rule that has always
existed of pennitting wide lee\vay in the admission of evidence
where defendant has pleaded guilty and the only issues being
tried relate to the degree of the crime and the penalty to be
imposed.
[3] lei. - Judgment - Procedure for Determining Penalty. - Pen.
Code, § 190.1, providing for separate trials of the guilt and
penalty issues for offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment, does not limit evidence of background and history or of
facts in aggravation or mitigation to defendant's activities
before the crime was committed or to his activities in this
state. What he has done outside the state or after the crime
was committed may be as relevant to the issue of penalty as
what he has done within the state or before the crime was
committed.

APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno
County. Harold V. Thompson, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for armed robbery and conspiracy to commit
armed robbery, and for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing the death penalty on the murder count, affirmed.
{I] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, §270 et seq.
Kclt. Dig. Reference: [1-3] Criminal Law, § 1011.1.
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J. Montgomery Cartcr, under appointment by the Supreme
Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, Assistant
Attorney General, Raymond M. Momboisse and Edsel W.
Haws, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-By information defendants Bentley,
Waldo, and Chapple were charged with the crimes of armed
robbery (Pen. Code, § 211a) , conspiracy to commit armed robbery (Pen. Code, § 182), and murder (Pen. Code, § 187). They
all pleaded not guilty. Bentley also pleaded not guilty by
reason of insanity. Thereafter \Valdo and Bentley withdrew
their pleas of not guilty and pleaded guilty. The trial court
determined that the murder was of the first degree on the
ground that it was committed in the perpetration of robbery.
(Pen. Code, § 189.) Neither court nor counsel interpreted
Bentley's plea of guilty as withdrawing his plea of not guilty
by reason of insanity. (Cf. Pen. Code, § 1016.) On that plea,
a jury determined that Bentley was sane. At the trial on the
issue of penalty, a second jury fixed his penalty at death and
Waldo's penalty at life imprisonment. The trial court denied
Bentley's motion for reduction of the penalty or for a new
trial on the issue of penalty and entered judgment imposing
the death penalty. In a separate trial, a jury found Chapple
guilty of first degree murder and of the other crimes charged.
The issue of penalty was submitted to the court, which fixed
his penalty at life imprisonment. Bentley'S appeal is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)
On the evening of May 22, 1961, pursuant to a plan to
commit a robbery, Chapple drove Bentley and \Valdo from
Chapple's home to a liquor store in Fresno. Chapple's wife
and small daughter went along. Chapple parked the car
behind the store. Bentley and Waldo got out and approached
the proprietor at the front door of his store as he was closing
it for the ~ight. Bentley fired two shots. One struck the proprietor in the chest and abdomen causing him to fall. Waldo
then shot him in the head. The wounds were fatal. Waldo and
Bentley took money and liquor and returned to the waiting
car. After abandoning a plan to rob another liquor store because too many people wcre present, they returned to the
Chapple home. The day before the murder, Chapple, accompanied by his wife and child, drove Waldo and Bentley to a
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liquor store in Modesto where they committed a similar robbery but did not kill the victim. After the murder, Waldo
and Bentley went to Arizona.
A careful review of the record establishes that the trial was
conducted with scrupulous regard for defendants' rights.
[1 a] Bentley's sole contention ou appeal is that the trial
court committed prejudicial error in admitting evidence of a
criminal venture by him and Waldo in Arizona about a month
after the murder. He contends that this evidence was inadmissible on the grounds that it related to crimes committed outside
the state after the crime for which the penalty was being
determined and that its probative value was outweighed by
its prejudicial effect.
Penal Code section 190.1 provides that at the trial on the
issue of penalty evidence may be presented "of the circumstances surrounding the crime, of the defendant's background
and history, and of any facts in aggravation or mitigation of
the penalty." [2] This section "embodies the broad, liberal rule on admission of evidence that has always existed
where a defendant has pleaded guilty and the only issues
being tried relate to the degree of the crime and the penalty
to be imposed. In such cases wide leeway in the admission of
evidence is permitted. [Citations.]" (People v. Jones, 52 Cal.
2d 636, 647 [343 P.2d 577].) [3] Section 190.1 does not
limit evidence of background and history or of facts in aggravatiou or mitigation to the defendant's activities before the
crime was committed or to his activities in this state. What he
has done outside the state or after the murder was committed
may be as relevant to the issue of penalty as what he has
done within the state or before the murder was committed.
(See People v. Jones, 52 Ca1.2d 636, 645 [343 P.2d 577];
People v. Friend, 50 Ca1.2d 570, 573 [327 P.2d 97] ; People v.
Friend, 47 Ca1.2d 749, 763 [306 P.2d 463] ; People v. Pike,
ante, pp. 70, 93-95 [22 Cal. Rptr. 664, 372 P.2d 656] ; People
v. Welch, ante, pp. 271, 273 [23 Cal.Rptr. 363, 373 P.2d
427] ; Pen. Code, § 644.)
[1 b] In' the present case the People produced evidence
that Bentley and Waldo cocrced four teen-age boys to accompany them in the commission of the robbery, kidnapping and
nttempted murder of a service station attendant in Arizona
about a month after the Fresno murder was committed. As in
the case of the California crimes, Bentley appeared to be the
ringleader. He displayed a complete indifference to human
life, and it was only the victim's tenacity in battling his assail-
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ants that prevented another murder. The People did not seek
to prove these facts by inadmissible hearsay as in People v.
Purvis, 56 Ca1.2d 93, 97 [13 Cal.Rptr. 801, 362 P.2d 713] (see
also People v. Purvis, 52 Ca1.2d 871, 883 [346 P.2d 22]), but
by the testimony of eyewitnesses.
Bentley contends, however, that there was ample other evidence in the record of his repeated criminal behavior and
that the evidence of the Arizona crimes was not only unnecessarily cumulative but was presented in such detail as to be
unduly inflammatory. Although there was evidence that Bentley had committed many armed robberies in the past, there
was no evidence that he had killed any of his victims before
the Fresno robbery. The jury was entitled to know that he
was not revulsed by that killing but was willing to kill again.
It could consider that willingness for what bearing it might
have on whether Bentley's shooting of the Fresno victim was
accidental or intentional; whether it was premeditated or
occurred on the spur of the moment. Unlike People v. Love,
53 Ca1.2d 843 [350 P.2d 705], the People did not present
inflammatory evidence of facts that were already in evidence
and that were of doubtful relevance at best, but only eyewitness testimony necessary to establish what Bentley said
and did in the course of the Arizona crimes.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J., and
Tobriner, J., concurred.
Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment.

